| Greek text | English text |
|---|---|
| ΕΠΙΚΟΥΡΟΣ ΜΕΝΟΙΚΕΙ ΧΑΙΡΕΙΝ | EPICURUS TO MENOECEUS |
| [122] Μήτε νέος τις ὢν μελλέτω φιλοσοφεῖν, μήτε γέρων ὑπάρχων κοπιάτω φιλοσοφῶν. | [122] Let no one when young delay to study philosophy, nor when he is old grow weary of his study. |
| οὔτε γὰρ ἄωρος οὐδείς ἐστίν οὔτε πάρωρος πρὸς τὸ κατὰ ψυχὴν ὑγιαῖνον. | For no one can come too early or too late to secure the health of his soul. |
| ὁ δὲ λέγων ἢ μήπω τοῦ φιλοσοφεῖν ὑπάρχειν ἢ παρεληλυθέναι τὴν ὥραν ὅμοιός ἐστι τῷ λέγοντι πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν ἢ μήπω παρεῖναι τὴν ὥραν ἢ μηκέτ᾽ εἶναι. | And the man who says that the age for philosophy has either not yet come or has gone by is like the man who says that the age for happiness is not yet come to him, or has passed away. |
| ὥστε φιλοσοφητέον καὶ νέῳ καὶ γέροντι, τῷ μὲν ὅπως γηράσκων νεάζῃ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς διὰ τὴν χάριν τῶν γεγονότων, τῷ δὲ ὅπως νέος ἅμα καὶ παλαιὸς ᾖ διὰ τὴν ἀφοβίαν τῶν μελλόντων. | Wherefore both when young and old a man must study philosophy, that as he grows old he may be young in blessings through the grateful recollection of what has been, and that in youth he may be old as well, since he will know no fear of what is to come. |
| μελετᾶν οὖν χρὴ τὰ ποιοῦντα τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, εἴ περ παρούσης μὲν αὐτῆς πάντα ἔχομεν, ἀπούσης δὲ πάντα πράττομεν εἰς τὸ ταύτην ἔχειν. | We must then meditate on the things that make our happiness, seeing that when that is with us we have all, but when it is absent we do all to win it. |
| [123] Ἃ δέ σοι συνεχῶς παρήγγελλον, ταῦτα καὶ πρᾶττε καὶ μελέτα, στοιχεῖα τοῦ καλῶς ζῆν ταῦτ᾽ εἶναι διαλαμβάνων. | [123] The things which I used unceasingly to commend to you, these do and practice, considering them to be the first principles of the good life. |
| πρῶτον μὲν τὸν θεὸν ζῷον ἄφθαρτον καὶ μακάριον νομίζων, ὡς ἡ κοινὴ τοῦ θεοῦ νόησις ὑπεγράφη, μηθὲν μήτε τῆς ἀφθαρσίας ἀλλότριον μήτε τῆς μακαριότητος ἀνοίκειον αὐτῷ πρόσαπτε· | First of all believe that god is a being immortal and blessed, even as the common idea of a god is engraved on men’s minds, and do not assign to him anything alien to his immortality or ill-suited to his blessedness: |
| πᾶν δὲ τὸ φυλάττειν αὐτοῦ δυνάμενον τὴν μετὰ ἀφθαρσίας μακαριότητα περὶ αὐτὸν δόξαζε. | but believe about him everything that can uphold his blessedness and immortality. |
| θεοὶ μὲν γὰρ εἰσίν· | For gods they are, |
| ἐναργὴς γὰρ αὐτῶν ἐστιν ἡ γνῶσις. | since the knowledge of them is by clear vision. |
| οἵους δ᾽ αὐτοὺς <οἱ> πολλοὶ νομίζουσιν, οὐκ εἰσίν· | But they are not such as the many believe them to be: |
| οὐ γὰρ φυλάττουσιν αὐτοὺς οἵους νομίζουσιν. | for indeed they do not consistently represent them as they believe them to be. |
| ἀσεβὴς δὲ οὐχ ὁ τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν θεοὺς ἀναιρῶν, ἀλλ᾽ ὁ τὰς τῶν πολλῶν δόξας θεοῖς προσάπτων. | And the impious man is not he who denies the gods of the many, but he who attaches to the gods the beliefs of the many. |
| [124] οὐ γὰρ προλήψεις εἰσὶν ἀλλ᾽ ὑπολήψεις ψευδεῖς αἱ τῶν πολλῶν ὑπὲρ θεῶν ἀποφάσεις, ἔνθεν αἱ μέγισται βλάβαι τε τοῖς κακοῖς ἐκ θεῶν ἐπάγονται καὶ ὠφέλειαι <τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς>. | [124] For the statements of the many about the gods are not conceptions derived from sensation, but false suppositions, according to which the greatest misfortunes befall the wicked and the greatest blessings (the good) by the gift of the gods. |
| ταῖς γὰρ ἰδίαις οἰκειούμενοι διὰ παντὸς ἀρεταῖς τοὺς ὁμοίους ἀποδέχονται, πᾶν τὸ μὴ τοιοῦτον ὡς ἀλλότριον νομίζοντες. | For men being accustomed always to their own virtues welcome those like themselves, but regard all that is not of their nature as alien. |
| Συνέθιζε δὲ ἐν τῷ νομίζειν μηδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς εἶναι τὸν θάνατον· | Become accustomed to the belief that death is nothing to us. |
| ἐπεὶ πᾶν ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν ἐν αἰσθήσει· | For all good and evil consists in sensation, |
| στέρησις δὲ ἐστὶν αἰσθήσεως ὁ θάνατος. | but death is deprivation of sensation. |
| ὅθεν γνῶσις ὀρθὴ τοῦ μηθὲν εἶναι πρὸς ἡμᾶς τὸν θάνατον ἀπολαυστὸν ποιεῖ τὸ τῆς ζωῆς θνητόν, οὐκ ἄπειρον προστιθεῖσα χρόνον ἀλλὰ τὸν τῆς ἀθανασίας ἀφελομένη πόθον. | And therefore a right understanding that death is nothing to us makes the mortality of life enjoyable, not because it adds to it an infinite span of time, but because it takes away the craving for immortality. |
| [125] οὐθὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἐν τῷ ζῆν δεινὸν τῷ κατειληφότι γνησίως τὸ μηδὲν ὑπάρχειν ἐν τῷ μὴ ζῆν δεινόν. | [125] For there is nothing terrible in life for the man who has truly comprehended that there is nothing terrible in not living. |
| ὥστε μάταιος ὁ λέγων δεδιέναι τὸν θάνατον οὐχ ὅτι λυπήσει παρών, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι λυπεῖ μέλλων. | So that the man speaks but idly who says that he fears death not because it will be painful when it comes, but because it is painful in anticipation. |
| ὃ γὰρ παρὸν οὐκ ἐνοχλεῖ, προσδοκώμενον κενῶς λυπεῖ. | For that which gives no trouble. when it comes, is but an empty pain in anticipation. |
| τὸ φρικωδέστατον οὖν τῶν κακῶν ὁ θάνατος οὐθὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ἐπειδήπερ ὅταν μὲν ἡμεῖς ὦμεν, ὁ θάνατος οὐ πάρεστιν· | So death, the most terrifying of ills, is nothing to us, since so long as we exist, death is not with us; |
| ὅταν δ᾽ ὁ θάνατος παρῇ, τόθ᾽ ἡμεῖς οὐκ ἐσμέν. | but when death comes, then we do not exist. |
| οὔτε οὖν πρὸς τοὺς ζῶντας ἐστὶν οὔτε πρὸς τοὺς τετελευτηκότας, ἐπειδήπερ περὶ οὕς μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, οἳ δ᾽ οὐκέτ᾽ εἰσίν. | It does not then concern either the living or the dead, since for the former it is not, and the latter are no more. |
| Ἀλλ᾽ οἱ πολλοὶ τὸν θάνατον ὁτὲ μὲν ὡς μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν φεύγουσιν, ὁτὲ δὲ ὡς ἀνάπαυσιν τῶν ἐν τῷ ζῆν <κακῶν ποθοῦσιν. | But the many at one moment shun death as the greatest of evils, at another (yearn for it) as a respite from the <evils> in life. |
| [126] ὁ δὲ σοφὸς οὔτε παραιτεῖται τὸ ζῆν> οὔτε φοβεῖται τὸ μὴ ζῆν· | [126] <But the wise man neither seeks to escape life> nor fears the cessation of life, |
| οὔτε γὰρ αὐτῷ προσίσταται τὸ ζῆν οὔτε δοξάζεται κακὸν εἶναί τι τὸ μὴ ζῆν. | for neither does life offend him nor does the absence of life seem to be any evil. |
| ὥσπερ δὲ σιτίον οὐ τὸ πλεῖον πάντως ἀλλὰ τὸ ἥδιστον αἱρεῖται, οὕτω καὶ χρόνον οὐ τὸν μήκιστον ἀλλὰ τὸν ἥδιστον καρπίζεται. | And just as with food he does not seek simply the larger share and nothing else, but rather the most pleasant, so he seeks to enjoy not the longest period of time, but the most pleasant. |
| Ὁ δὲ παραγγέλλων τὸν μὲν νέον καλῶς ζῆν, τὸν δὲ γέροντα καλῶς καταστρέφειν εὐήθης ἐστὶν οὐ μόνον διὰ τὸ τῆς ζωῆς ἀσπαστόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὸ τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι μελέτην τοῦ καλῶς ζῆν καὶ τοῦ καλῶς ἀποθνῄσκειν. | And he who counsels the young man to live well, but the old man to make a good end, is foolish, not merely because of the desirability of life, but also because it is the same training which teaches to live well and to die well. |
| πολὺ δὲ χεῖρων καὶ ὁ λέγων καλὸν μὲν μὴ φῦναι, | Yet much worse still is the man who says it is good not to be born, but |
| φύντα δ᾽ ὅπως ὤκιστα πύλας Ἀίδαο περῆσαι. | 'once born make haste to pass the gates of Death'. |
| [127] Εἰ μὲν γὰρ πεποιθὼς τοῦτό φησι, πῶς οὐκ ἀπέρχεται ἐκ τοῦ ζῆν; | [127] For if he says this from conviction why does he not pass away out of life? |
| ἐν ἑτοίμῳ γὰρ αὐτῷ τοῦτ᾽ ἐστίν, εἴ περ ἦν βεβουλευμένον αὐτῷ βεβαίως· | For it is open to him to do so, if he had firmly made up his mind to this. |
| εἰ δὲ μωκώμενος, μάταιος ἐν τοῖς οὐκ ἐπιδεχομένοις. | But if he speaks in jest, his words are idle among men who cannot receive them. |
| Μνημονευτέον δὲ ὡς τὸ μέλλον οὔτε ἡμέτερον οὔτε πάντως οὐχ ἡμέτερον, ἵνα μήτε πάντως προσμένωμεν ὡς ἐσόμενον μήτε ἀπελπίζωμεν ὡς πάντως οὐκ ἐσόμενον. | We must then bear in mind that the future is neither ours, nor yet wholly not ours, so that we may not altogether expect it as sure to come, nor abandon hope of it, as if it will certainly not come. |
| Ἀναλογιστέον δὲ ὡς τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν αἳ μέν εἰσι φυσικαί, αἳ δὲ κεναί, καὶ τῶν φυσικῶν αἳ μὲν ἀναγκαῖαι, αἳ δὲ φυσικαὶ μόνον· | We must consider that of desires some are natural, others vain, and of the natural some are necessary and others merely natural; |
| τῶν δ᾽ ἀναγκαίων αἳ μὲν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν εἰσὶν ἀναγκαῖαι, αἳ δὲ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἀοχλησίαν, αἳ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ζῆν. | and of the necessary some are necessary for happiness, others for the repose of the body, and others for very life. |
| [128] τούτων γὰρ ἀπλανὴς θεωρία πᾶσαν αἵρεσιν καὶ φυγὴν ἐπανάγειν οἶδεν ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος ὑγίειαν καὶ τὴν <τῆς ψυχῆς> ἀταραξίαν, ἐπεὶ τοῦτο τοῦ μακαρίως ζῆν ἐστι τέλος. | [128] The right understanding of these facts enables us to refer all choice and avoidance to the health of the body and <the soul’s> freedom from disturbance, since this is the aim of the life of blessedness. |
| τούτου γὰρ χάριν πάντα πράττομεν, ὅπως μήτε ἀλγῶμεν μήτε ταρβῶμεν. | For it is to obtain this end that we always act, namely, to avoid pain and fear. |
| ὅταν δὲ ἅπαξ τοῦτο περὶ ἡμᾶς γένηται, λύεται πᾶς ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς χειμών, οὐκ ἔχοντος τοῦ ζῴου βαδίζειν ὡς πρὸς ἐνδέον τι καὶ ζητεῖν ἕτερον ᾧ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀγαθὸν συμπληρώσεται. | And when this is once secured for us, all the tempest of the soul is dispersed, since the living creature has not to wander as though in search of something that is missing, and to look for some other thing by which he can fulfil the good of the soul and the good of the body. |
| τότε γὰρ ἡδονῆς χρείαν ἔχομεν, ὅταν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ παρεῖναι τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀλγῶμεν· | For it is then that we have need of pleasure, when we feel pain owing to the absence of pleasure; |
| <ὅταν δὲ μὴ ἀλγῶμεν>, οὐκέτι τῆς ἡδονῆς δεόμεθα. | <but when we do not feel pain>, we no longer need pleasure. |
| καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τέλος λέγομεν εἶναι τοῦ μακαρίως ζῆν. | And for this cause we call pleasure the beginning and end of the blessed life. |
| [129] ταύτην γὰρ ἀγαθὸν πρῶτον καὶ συγγενικὸν ἔγνωμεν, καὶ ἀπὸ ταύτης καταρχόμεθα πάσης αἱρέσεως καὶ φυγῆς καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτην καταντῶμεν ὡς κανόνι τῷ πάθει πᾶν ἀγαθὸν κρίνοντες. | [129] For we recognize pleasure as the first good innate in us, and from pleasure we begin every act of choice and avoidance, and to pleasure we return again, using the feeling as the standard by which we judge every good. |
| Καὶ ἐπεὶ πρῶτον ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο καὶ σύμφυτον, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ οὐ πᾶσαν ἡδονὴν αἱρούμεθα, ἀλλ᾽ ἔστιν ὅτε πολλὰς ἡδονὰς ὑπερβαίνομεν, ὅταν πλεῖον ἡμῖν τὸ δυσχερὲς ἐκ τούτων ἕπηται· | And since pleasure is the first good and natural to us, for this very reason we do not choose every pleasure, but sometimes we pass over many pleasures, when greater discomfort accrues to us as the result of them: |
| καὶ πολλὰς ἀλγηδόνας ἡδονῶν κρείττους νομίζομεν, ἐπειδὰν μείζων ἡμῖν ἡδονὴ παρακολουθῇ πολὺν χρόνον ὑπομείνασι τὰς ἀλγηδόνας. | and similarly we think many pains better than pleasures, since a greater pleasure comes to us when we have endured pains for a long time. |
| πᾶσα οὖν ἡδονὴ διὰ τὸ φύσιν ἔχειν οἰκείαν ἀγαθόν, οὐ πᾶσα μέντοι αἱρετή· | Every pleasure then because of its natural kinship to us is good, yet not every pleasure is to be chosen: |
| καθάπερ καὶ ἀλγηδὼν πᾶσα κακόν, οὐ πᾶσα δὲ ἀεὶ φευκτὴ πεφυκυῖα. | even as every pain also is an evil, yet not all are always of a nature to be avoided. |
| [130] τῇ μέντοι συμμετρήσει καὶ συμφερόντων καὶ ἀσυμφόρων βλέψει ταῦτα πάντα κρίνειν καθήκει. | [130] Yet by a scale of comparison and by the consideration of advantages and disadvantages we must form our judgement on all these matters. |
| χρώμεθα γὰρ τῷ μὲν ἀγαθῷ κατά τινας χρόνους ὡς κακῷ, τῷ δὲ κακῷ τοὔμπαλιν ὡς ἀγαθῷ. | For the good on certain occasions we treat as bad, and conversely the bad as good. |
| Καὶ τὴν αὖτάρκειαν δὲ ἀγαθὸν μέγα νομίζομεν, οὐχ ἵνα πάντως τοῖς ὀλίγοις χρώμεθα, ἀλλ᾽ ὅπως ἐὰν μὴ ἔχωμεν τὰ πολλά, τοῖς ὀλίγοις χρώμεθα, πεπεισμένοι γνησίως ὅτι ἥδιστα πολυτελείας ἀπολαύουσιν οἱ ἥκιστα ταύτης δεόμενοι, καὶ ὅτι τὸ μὲν φυσικὸν πᾶν εὐπόριστόν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ κενὸν δυσπόριστον. | And again independence of desire we think a great good—not that we may at all times enjoy but a few things, but that, if we do not possess many, we may enjoy the few in the genuine persuasion that those have the sweetest pleasure in luxury who least need it, and that all that is natural is easy to be obtained, but that which is superfluous is hard. |
| οἱ τε λιτοὶ χυλοὶ ἴσην πολυτελεῖ διαίτῃ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐπιφέρουσιν, ὅταν ἅπαν τὸ ἀλγοῦν κατ᾽ ἔνδειαν ἐξαιρεθῇ· | And so plain savours bring us a pleasure equal to a luxurious diet, when all the pain due to want is removed; |
| [131] καὶ μαζα καὶ ὕδωρ τὴν ἀκροτάτην ἀποδίδωσιν ἡδονήν, ἐπειδὰν ἐνδέων τις αὐτὰ προσενέγκηται. | [131] and bread and water produce the highest pleasure, when one who needs them puts them to his lips. |
| τὸ συνεθίζειν οὖν ἐν ταῖς ἁπλαῖς καὶ οὐ πολυτελέσι διαίταις καὶ ὑγιείας ἐστὶ συμπληρωτικὸν καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἀναγκαίας τοῦ βίου χρήσεις ἄοκνον ποιεῖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ τοῖς πολυτελέσιν ἐκ διαλειμμάτων προσερχομένους κρεῖττον ἡμᾶς διατίθησι καὶ πρὸς τὴν τύχην ἀφόβους παρασκευάζει. | To grow accustomed therefore to simple and not luxurious diet gives us health to the full, and makes a man alert for the needful employments of life, and when after long intervals we approach luxuries disposes us better towards them, and fits us to be fearless of fortune. |
| Ὅταν οὖν λέγωμεν ἡδονὴν τέλος ὑπάρχειν, οὐ τὰς τῶν ἀσώτων ἡδονὰς καὶ τὰς ἐν ἀπολαύσει κειμένας λέγομεν, ὥς τινες ἀγνοοῦντες καὶ οὐχ ὁμολογοῦντες ἢ κακῶς ἐκδεχόμενοι νομίζουσιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μήτε ἀλγεῖν κατὰ σῶμα μήτε ταράττεσθαι κατὰ ψυχήν· | When, therefore, we maintain that pleasure is the end, we do not mean the pleasures of profligates and those that consist in sensuality, as is supposed by some who are either ignorant or disagree with us or do not understand, but freedom from pain in the body and from trouble in the mind. |
| [132] οὐ γὰρ πότοι καὶ κῶμοι συνείροντες οὐδ᾽ ἀπολαύσεις παίδων καὶ γυναικῶν οὐδ᾽ ἰχθύων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ὅσα φέρει πολυτελὴς τράπεζα, τὸν ἡδὺν γεννᾷ βίον, ἀλλὰ νήφων λογισμὸς καὶ τὰς αἰτίας ἐξερευνῶν πάσης αἱρέσεως καὶ φυγῆς καὶ τὰς δόξας ἐξελαύνων, ἐξ ὧν πλεῖστος τὰς ψυχὰς καταλαμβάνει θόρυβος. | [132] For it is not continuous drinkings and revellings, nor the satisfaction of lusts, nor the enjoyment of fish and other luxuries of the wealthy table, which produce a pleasant life, but sober reasoning, searching out the motives for all choice and avoidance, and banishing mere opinions, to which are due the greatest disturbance of the spirit. |
| Τούτων δὲ πάντων ἀρχὴ καὶ τὸ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν φρόνησις. | Of all this the beginning and the greatest good is prudence. |
| διὸ καὶ φιλοσοφίας τιμιώτερον ὑπάρχει φρόνησις, ἐξ ἧς αἱ λοιπαὶ πᾶσαι πεφύκασιν ἀρεταί, διδάσκουσα ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδέως ζῆν ἄνευ τοῦ φρονίμως καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως <οὐδὲ φρονίμως καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως> ἄνευ τοῦ ἡδέως. | Wherefore prudence is a more precious thing even than philosophy: for from prudence are sprung all the other virtues, and it teaches us that it is not possible to live pleasantly without living prudently and honourably and justly, <nor, again, to live a life of prudence, honour, and justice> without living pleasantly. |
| συμπεφύκασι γὰρ αἱ ἀρεταὶ τῷ ζῆν ἡδέως, καὶ τὸ ζῆν ἡδέως τούτων ἐστὶν ἀχώριστον. | For the virtues are by nature bound up with the pleasant life, and the pleasant life is inseparable from them. |
| [133] ἐπεὶ τίνα νομίζεις εἶναι κρείττονα τοῦ καὶ περὶ θεῶν ὅσια δοξάζοντος καὶ περὶ θανάτου διὰ παντὸς ἀφόβως ἔχοντος καὶ τὸ τῆς φύσεως ἐπιλελογισμένου τέλος, καὶ τὸ μὲν τῶν ἀγαθῶν πέρας ὡς ἔστιν εὐσυμπλήρωτόν τε καὶ εὐπόριστον διαλαμβάνοντος, τὸ δὲ τῶν κακῶν ὡς ἢ χρόνους ἢ πόνους ἔχει βραχεῖς, τὴν δὲ ὑπό τινων δεσπότιν εἰσαγομένην πάντων διαγελῶντος <εἱμαρμένην; * * * * * ὧν ἃ μὲν κατ᾽ ἀνάγκην γίνεται>, ἃ δὲ ἀπὸ τύχης, ἃ δὲ παρ᾽ ἡμᾶς διὰ τὸ τὴν μὲν ἀνάγκην ἀνυπεύθυνον εἶναι, τὴν δὲ τύχην ἄστατον ὁρᾶν, τὸ δὲ παρ᾽ ἡμᾶς ἀδέσποτον, ᾧ καὶ τὸ μεμπτὸν καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον παρακολουθεῖν πέφυκεν | [133] For indeed who, think you, is a better man than he who holds reverent opinions concerning the gods, and is at all times free from fear of death, and has reasoned out the end ordained by nature? He understands that the limit of good things is easy to fulfil and easy to attain, whereas the course of ills is either short in time or slight in pain: he laughs at <destiny>, whom some have introduced as the mistress of all things. <He thinks that with us lies the chief power in determining events, some of which happen by necessity> and some by chance, and some are within our control; for while necessity cannot be called to account, he sees that chance is inconstant, but that which is in our control is subject to no master, and to it are naturally attached praise and blame. |
| [134] (ἐπεὶ κρεῖττον ἦν τῷ περὶ θεῶν μύθῳ κατακολουθεῖν ἢ τῇ τῶν φυσικῶν εἱμαρμένῃ δουλεύειν· | [134] For, indeed, it were better to follow the myths about the gods than to become a slave to the destiny of the natural philosophers: |
| ὃ μὲν γὰρ ἐλπίδα παραιτήσεως ὑπογράφει θεῶν διὰ τιμῆς, ἣ δὲ ἀπαραίτητον ἔχει τὴν ἀνάγκην)· | for the former suggests a hope of placating the gods by worship, whereas the latter involves a necessity which knows no placation. |
| τὴν δὲ τύχην οὔτε θεόν, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ νομίζουσιν, ὑπολαμβάνων (οὐθὲν γὰρ ἀτάκτως θεῷ πράττεται) οὔτε <πάντων> ἀβέβαιον αἰτίαν (<οὐκ> οἴεται μὲν γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν ἐκ ταύτης πρὸς τὸ μακαρίως ζῆν ἀνθρώποις δίδοσθαι, ἀρχὰς μέντοι μεγάλων ἀγαθῶν ἢ κακῶν ὑπὸ ταύτης χορηγεῖσθαι), | As to chance, he does not regard it as a god as most men do (for in a god’s acts there is no disorder), nor as an uncertain cause <of all things> for he does not believe that good and evil are given by chance to man for the framing of a blessed life, but that opportunities for great good and great evil are afforded by it. |
| [135] κρεῖττον εἶναι νομίζει εὐλογίστως ἀτυχεῖν ἢ ἀλογίστως εὐτυχεῖν (βέλτιστον γὰρ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι τὸ καλῶς κριθὲν <σφαλῆναι μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ κακῶς κριθὲν> ὀρθωθῆναι διὰ ταύτην). | [135] He therefore thinks it better to be unforunfortunate in reasonable action than to prosper in unreason. For it is better in a man’s actions that what is well chosen <should fail, rather than that what is ill chosen> should be successful owing to chance. |
| Ταῦτα οὖν καὶ τὰ τούτοις συγγενῆ μελέτα πρὸς σεαὐτὸν ἡμέρας καὶ νυκτὸς πρός <τε> τὸν ὅμοιον σεαυτῷ, καὶ οὐδέποτε οὔθ᾽ ὕπαρ οὔτ᾽ ὄναρ διαταραχθήσῃ, ζήσεις δὲ ὡς θεὸς ἐν ἀνθρώποις. | Meditate therefore on these things and things akin to them night and day by yourself; and with a companion like to yourself, and never shall you be disturbed waking or asleep, but you shall live like a god among men. |
| οὐθὲν γὰρ ἔοικε θνητῷ ζῴῳ ζῶν ἄνθρωπος ἐν ἀθανάτοις ἀγαθοῖς. | For a man who lives among immortal blessings is not like to a mortal being. |